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Abstract
The objective of this article is to provide the analyst with the necessary tools that
allow for a robust ordering of joint distributions of health and income. We contribute
to the literature on the measurement and inference of socioeconomic health inequality
in three distinct but complementary ways. First, we provide a formalization of the
socioeconomic health inequality-specific ethical principle introduced by Erreygers, Clark
and Van Ourti, (2012). Second, we propose new graphical tools and dominance tests
for the identification of robust orderings of joint distributions of income and health
associated with this new ethical principle. Finally, based on both pro-poor and pro-
extreme ranks ethical principles we address a very important aspect of dominance
literature: the inference. To illustrate the empirical relevance of the proposed approach,
we compare joint distributions of income and a health-related behavior in the United
States in 1997 and 2014.
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1 Introduction
Measuring socioeconomic health inequality is important from a social perspective and is
critical when evaluating the impact of health policy reforms on the distribution of popu-
lation’s health. There is a large body of literature on the measurement of socioeconomic
health inequalities most of which has focused on the properties and issues arising from the
use of these indices as well as the ethical principles they should obey. Some argue that
the analyst should be concerned with inequalities that occur in the lower part of the distri-
bution of socioeconomic status (Wagstaff, 2002) and others suggest that the analyst may
be more concerned with deviations occurring away from the median of the socioeconomic
status (Erreygers, Clarke and Van Ourti, 2012). While the desirable ethical principles for
these measures may still be on the debate table, this paper adopts a unified approach by
including both possibilities. As such, the overarching objective of this paper is to provide
the analyst with the necessary tools that allow for a robust ordering of joint distributions
of health and income including the associated statistical inference compatible with both
ethical principles.
This paper contributes to the literature on socioeconomic health inequality measure-
ment and inference in three distinct but complementary ways. First, it contributes to the
literature that formalizes the ethical principles underlying socioeconomic health inequality
indices by offering a formalization of Erreygers, Clarke and Van Ourti’s (2012) view of
what is considered an alternative ethical property for these indices. In doing so, it pro-
vides a formal presentation of the ethical principles associated with indices that pass the
upside-down test and coins these principles as the symmetry around the median principle
(at the second order) and the pro-extreme rank principles (at higher orders). Second, it
contributes to the socioeconomic health inequality measurement literature by introducing
new graphical tools associated with these principles, a new class of range curves, and by
1
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deriving the associated dominance conditions. These range curves have a role analogous to
the one played by health concentration curves where the analyst assumes pro-poor ethical
principles. Developing new dominance conditions (for these new range curves) will help the
analyst identify robust orderings under the assumptions of symmetry around the median
and pro-extreme rank. Finally, it contributes to the literature on hypothesis testing for
dominance conditions by providing estimators of health concentration curves and health
range curves as well as consistent testing methods for dominance compatible with both
ethical principles.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief
review of the literature on measures of socioeconomic health inequality, the basic ethical
principles on which they are founded as well as the associated literature on inference. In
Section 3, we describe the measurement framework in which we are operating and discuss
the associated basic ethical principles. In Section 4, we examine higher order ethical prin-
ciples for pro-poor and pro-extreme rank ethical principles then define the sets of indices
obeying these principles. In Section 5, we present the health concentration curve, the s-
health concentration curves, the health range curve, the s-health range curves and their
respective generalized versions. We also develop dominance conditions to identify robust
orderings for the sets of indices developed in Section 4. In Section 6, we present the natural
estimators for the curves presented in Section 5 and develop the statistical inference to
test for dominance. In Section 7, we provide an empirical illustration using information on
cigarette consumption and overweightedness from National Health Interview Survey (NHIS)
in 1997 and 2014. Finally, Section 8 concludes and presents future research directions.
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2 Literature Review
This paper is related to two main strains in the literature, the literature on the measurement
of socioeconomic health inequality and the literature on hypothesis testing for dominance
in the context of inequality. To highlight our contributions, we provide a brief review of
the relevant literature.
The most traditional measure of socioeconomic health inequality is the concentration in-
dex proposed by Wagstaff, Paci and van Doorslaer (1991). It has a mathematical structure
that assumes a very specific level of aversion to socioeconomic health inequality. Wagstaff
(2002) argues that it may be desirable to consider other levels of inequality aversion than
the one implicitly assumed in the standard concentration index. He suggests the extended
health concentration indices that allow for a wider range of levels for aversion to socioe-
conomic health inequality. Furthermore, the mathematical structure of the concentration
index imposes a specific type of aversion to socioeconomic health inequality. Intuitively,
its structure implies that the contribution of an individual’s health level to socioeconomic
health inequality is increasing with socioeconomic status (Bleichrodt and van Doorslaer,
2004).
Erreygers, Clarke and Van Ourti (2012) highlight that the use of extended health con-
centration indices imposes a specific ethical view on what constitutes an increase in aversion
to socioeconomic health inequality; they label it pro-poor transfer sensitivity. In the con-
text of pro-poor transfer sensitivity, increasing aversion to socioeconomic health inequality
is achieved by increasing the weight of transfers occurring at lower ranks of socioeconomic
distribution. This well-known ethical position is based on a concept developed in the
(unidimensional) income inequality literature and is adapted to fit the (bi-dimensional)
socioeconomic health inequality context. Erreygers, Clarke and Van Ourti (2012) propose
alternative ethical principles that we label as the symmetry around the median principle
3
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and pro-extreme rank transfer sensitivity principles. Based on this principle, an increase in
socioeconomic health inequality is achieved by increasing the weights on transfers occurring
farther away from the median of socioeconomic statuses.
Building on Wagstaff (2002), Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014) formalize the definition of
pro-poor transfer sensitivity principles and introduce higher orders of health concentration
curves, the s-health concentration curves. In their paper, they show how these curves can be
used to identify robust orderings of health distributions for indices obeying pro-poor trans-
fer sensitivity principles. This being said, they do not consider pro-extreme rank principles.
This paper fills this gap in the literature by formalizing the pro-extreme rank principles in-
troduced by Erreygers, Clarke and Van Ourti (2012) and deriving the corresponding higher
order ethical principles. It also contributes to the literature by proposing new graphical
tools associated with these principles; the health range curve and the s-health range curves.
These curves will be used to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for robust orderings
of joint distributions of income and health. From a measurement perspective, this paper is
related to Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014)1 yet is different from it in two distinct ways: the
ethical principles it formalizes as well as the graphical and dominance tools it proposes.
Compared to the literature on socioeconomic health inequality measures, the literature
on the statistical inference for these measures is scant as most of it focused on income
inequality measures (Kakwani, Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (1997) and O’Donnell, van
Dooslaer, Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008)2 are two exceptions). As for inference regarding
various forms of stochastic dominance, it followed the same pattern as statistical inference
1Makdissi and Yazbeck’s (2014) contribution to the literature is twofold. In a first step, the paper
addresses the measurement issues arising in the presence of multiple categorical health variables by proposing
a framework that consists of transforming these multiple categorical health variables into one cardinal health
measure. In a second step, they provide a formalization of the ethical principles on which this new cardinal
health measure is based. So, Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014) starts with categorical variables, proposes a
measure to cardinalize the categorical information, then formalizes the ethical principles associated with the
proposed (cardinalized) measure.
2They consider inference on a grid of points of the concentration curves in Chapter 7.
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on inequality measures. It focused on dominance tests in the context of income inequality
literature namely in Anderson (1996), Davidson and Duclos (2000), Barrett and Donald
(2003), Linton, Maasoumi and Whang (2005), Linton, Song and Whang (2010), Barrett,
Donald and Batcharaya (2014) as well as Schechtman, Shelef, Yitzhaki and Zitifkis (2008).
While Anderson (1996) test is based on the assumption that observations are drawn from
two independent distributions, Davidson and Duclos’s asymptotic approach to inference
allows for observations to be drawn from a joint distribution. However, as in Anderson
(1996), Davidson and Duclos’s test uses a fixed number of arbitrary grid points. The use of
fixed number of arbitrary grid points is not a desirable feature of the test as the decision will
be contingent to the choice of the grid points and thus inconsistent (Barrett and Donald,
2003). To overcome this issue, Barrett and Donald (2003) propose a consistent Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) type test. Their approach tests for dominance over all the points of the
support, however, their test (as Anderson’s) applies in cases where samples are drawn from
independent distributions of income. Thus, Barrett and Donald’s test does not allow for
dominance for bivariate measures of inequality (i.e., for marginal conditional dominance).
Schechtman et al. (2008) address this issue and propose a consistent statistical procedure
in the context of a bivariate measure of inequality; the absolute concentration curve (a.k.a
the generalized concentration curves in the health literature) in the context of portfolio
choice in finance.
This paper contributes to this literature by proposing a consistent statistical test akin
to the test Schechtman et al. (2008) and Barrett and Donald (2003) for the new dominance
conditions introduced in this paper. Given that the dominance conditions we develop are for
bivariate distributions, this paper is more akin to the work by Schechtman et al. (2008) than
to the work of Barrett Donald (2003) and Linton et al. (2005). Although the hypothesis
we are testing is, in some cases, mathematically analogous to the one tested in Schechtman
5
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et al. (2008), it remains different for three reasons. First, the framework and ethical
principles are different. As a result, many of the welfare foundations and mathematical
forms involved are different. Second, all estimators, dominance conditions and inference for
indices obeying pro-extreme rank ethical principles are new. Finally, all the higher order
dominance conditions for indices obeying higher order pro-poor ethical principles have no
available statistical inference in the literature.
3 Measurement framework
The purpose of this section is to set the measurement framework and elaborate on the eth-
ical principles underlying health achievement and relative socioeconomic health inequality
indices. These indices are functionals of the joint distributio of health, H and income, Y.
In this paper, the term “income” refers to a measure of socioeconomic status.
Let H and Y be 2 random variables that are absolutely continuous with support on the
positive half real line with densities fH and fY respectively, with a joint density fY,H and
with a cumulative distribution of income, FY (y).
3 We are interested in measuring health
achievement and relative socioeconomic health inequality in a rank-dependent framework
where ranks represent an individual’s position in the distribution of socioeconomic status.
In this context, a socioeconomic health inequality index can be written as
I (h) =
∫ 1
0
ν(p)
h(p)
µh
dp, (1)
where, µh =
∫ 1
0 h(p)dp is the expectation of H, ν(p) represents the social weight of an indi-
vidual at rank p ∈ [0, 1] in the income distribution, and h(p) is the conditional expectation
of health, H, with respect to Y equal to its p-quantile:
h(p) = E[H|Y = F−1Y (p)]. (2)
3In this paper, we assume that this health measure is a ratio-scale variable. For ease of exposition we
also assume that densities exist.
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In general, any index of socioeconomic health inequality can be interpreted as the ratio
between the cost in health achievement associated with socioeconomic health inequalities
and the average health level. This is why it is possible to write rank-dependent health
achievement indices as a function of socioeconomic health inequality indices. Thus, a health
achievement index A(h) can be directly be computed from a socioeconomic health inequality
index as
A(h) = µh(1− I(h)). (3)
This health achievement index can also be rewritten as
A (h) =
∫ 1
0
ω(p)h(p)dp, (4)
where ω(p) = 1− ν(p). The mathematical properties of the social weight function ν(p) and
ω(p) are associated with the indices’ ethical principles. The following section elaborates
on two different ethical principles underlying socioeconomic health inequality and health
achievement measures; the principle of income-related health transfer and the principle of
symmetry around the median.
3.1 Principle of income-related health transfer
According to this principle, the contribution of an individual’s health level to total health
achievement (socioeconomic health inequality) is non-increasing (increasing) with socioe-
conomic status. This means that ceteris paribus, if the rich (poor) are relatively healthier,
then the health achievement will be lower (higher), and the socioeconomic health inequal-
ity will be higher (lower). This ethical principle can be mathematically translated by the
following assumptions on the behavior of the derivatives of the weight functions:
A.1 ω(1)(p) ≤ 0
A.1’ ν(1)(p) > 0 (i.e. ω(1)(p) < 0),
7
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A.2
∫ 1
0 ω(p)dp = 1 (i.e.
∫ 1
0 ν(p)dp = 0),
where ω(i)(p) = ∂
iω(p)
∂pi
and ν(i)(p) = ∂
iν(p)
∂pi
. A(h), as defined in equation (4), is a rank-
dependent measure of health achievement when the weight function, ω(p) satisfies assump-
tions A.1. and A.2. Similarly, I(h), as defined in equation (1), is a rank-dependent measure
of socioeconomic health inequality when the weight function ν(p) satisfies assumptions A.1’
and A.2. The role of assumption A.2 is to guarantee that the weight function ν(p) sums to
zero (i.e.,
∫ 1
0 ν(p)dp = 0) and thus that inequality indices have two fundamental desirable
properties.4 The first desired property requires that in the absence of health inequality
(i.e., when everybody has the same health level), the inequality index I(h) value be equal
to zero. The second requires that I(h) remains unchanged if everyone’s health increases in
the same proportion. The roles of assumptions A.1 and A.1’ are embedded in Bleichrodt
and van Doorslaer (2006) principle of income-related health transfer.5
As illustrated in Figure 1, the principle of income-related health transfer implies that
performing a mean preserving health transfer δh from an individual at socioeconomic rank
p2 to a person at a lower socioeconomic rank p1, increases (decreases) health achievement
(socioeconomic health inequality).
Having elaborated on the underlying ethical principle, we define the sets of all rank
dependent health achievement and socioeconomic health inequality that we will be con-
sidering. In the remaining of this paper, we denote by Ω2 the set of all rank-dependent
health achievement indices obeying assumptions A.1 and A.2, and by Λ2 the set of all rank-
dependent socioeconomic health inequality indices obeying assumptions A.1’ and A.2. The
formal mathematical definitions of these set of indices as well as all subsequent subsets of
indices can be found in the appendix.
4Note that ν(p) = 1− ω(p).
5It is important to highlight the interpretation of the slight difference between assumptions A.1 and A.1’.
Assumption A.1 is less restrictive since it allows for ω(p) = 1 for all p whereas assumption A.1’ imposes a
strict inequality. When ω(1)(p) = 0 for all p is combined with A.2, there is only one possible weight function,
ω(p) = 1, the resulting health achievement is the unweighted average health level µh.
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3.2 Principle of symmetry around the median
According to Erreygers, Clarke and Van Ourti (2012), one may want to impose an additional
ethical constraint on the socioeconomic health inequality indices by focussing on those that
pass the upside-down test. This test consists in interchanging health levels of individuals
at rank p with their “carnival” counterpart at rank 1 − p. If an individual is at the 10th
percentile of the income distribution, her health level is compared with the health level
of the individual at the 90th percentile, and so on. Imposing this constraint means that
inequality is defined by focusing on the range of health levels r(p) = h(1 − p) − h(p) (for
p ∈ [0, 0.5]) rather than on the level h(p) itself. More formally, let g(p) = h(1 − p) be
the “carnival” counterpart distribution of h(p), the upside-down test consists in verifying if
I (g(p)) is always positive (negative) when I (h(p)) is negative (positive). Erreygers, Clarke
and Van Ourti (2012) show that an index passes this test only if its weight functions ν(p) is
symmetric around the median of socioeconomic statuses (i.e., around p = 0.5). This leads
to the following additional assumptions on the behavior of the social weight function:
A.3 ν(1− p) = −ν(p),
A3’ ω(1− p) = 2− ω(p).
Assumption A.3 and A.3’ implies that ν(0.5) = 0 and ω(0.5) = 1. These additional as-
sumptions allow us to define a subset of indices that pass the upside-down test, Λ2ρ and
propose the associated subset of health achievement indices, Ω2ρ.
6
3.3 Examples of parametric class of indices
As pointed by Erreygers, Clarke and Van Ourti (2012), equation (1) is reminiscent of
Mehran (1976) class of rank-dependent income inequality indices with a slight difference;
6These proposed health achievement indices passing the upside-down test are not yet available in the
literature, however, it is always possible to construct the health achievement index underlying each socioe-
conomic health inequality index.
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individual ranks (socioeconomic status) are not determined by the rank of the variable of
interest (health). The social weight functions, ν(p) and ω(p), may take different functional
forms that depend on socioeconomic rank p. As a result, each subset of the class of achieve-
ment or inequality indices will depend on the specific form imposed on its weight function.
For instance, if the analyst’s ethical position is compatible with sensitivity to poverty, then
a weight function ω(p) = ρ(1 − p)ρ−1, where ρ > 1 the socioeconomic health inequality
aversion parameter, is appropriate. In this case, equation (4) describes Wagstaff’s (2002)
class of health achievement indices, a subset of Ω2. For the same specific parametric form of
the weight function, equation (1) describes Wagstaff’s (2002) class of extended health con-
centration indices a subset of Λ2.7 One may want to impose an additional ethical constraint
on socioeconomic health inequality indices by requiring that they pass the upside-down test
(see, Erreygers, Clarke and van Ourti, 2012). In this case, if the analyst values transfers
occurring farther away from the median socioeconomic rank, then, sensitivity to extrem-
ities is an alternative to sensitivity to poverty. A compatible weight function would be
ν(p) = β2β−2
[(
p− 12
)2] (β−2)2 (
p− 12
)
, where β > 1 is the socioeconomic health inequality
aversion parameter. For this specific parametric weight function, equation (1) describes Er-
reygers, Clarke and Van Ourti’s (2012) class of symmetric health socioeconomic inequality
indices, which is a subset of Λ2.8 It is important to underline that the standard health con-
centration index (i.e., when ρ = 2) passes the upside-down test since 1−ρ(1−p)ρ−1 = 2p−1
is by construction symmetric around the median. However, for all values of ρ 6= 2, the ex-
tended health concentration and health achievement indices do not pass the upside-down
test.
Wagstaff (2002) class of extended health concentration indices and Erreygers, Clarke
and Van Ourti’s (2012) class of symmetric health socioeconomic inequality indices are both
7Note that for the standard health concentration index ρ = 2.
8Note that when β = 2, the symmetric health socioeconomic inequality index collapses to the health
concentration index.
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subsets of Λ2. While Wagstaff (2002) and Erreygers, Clarke and Van Ourti (2012) are
the most widely known indices in the health economics literature, there are other possible
health achievement and socioeconomic health inequality indices.9
To conclude, the income-related health transfer principle and the symmetry around the
median principle presented above have intuitive ethical interpretations. The first principle
puts more weight on what occurs in the bottom of the socioeconomic distribution based on
the level of health, the second principle imposes an additional focus on the range between
an individual’s health level and the health level of her “carnival” counterpart.
4 Higher order aversion to socioeconomic health inequality
The interpretations of higher order ethical principles are less straightforward than the sec-
ond order principles discussed in the previous section however; they still have an intuitive
interpretation. Generally, a higher order principle can be viewed as a higher degree of
aversion to socioeconomic health inequality. This means that, for a given transfer, the
magnitude of the social weight depends on the location of the health transfers in the dis-
tribution of the socioeconomic status. The higher the degree of aversion to inequality, the
larger is the relative magnitude of the social weight given to transfers at the bottom of the
income distribution. In this context, higher order ethical principles are defined by com-
paring health transfers instead of health levels. The appeal in imposing higher order of
aversion to socioeconomic health inequality resides in its capacity to increase the power of
ordering by narrowing to a subset of indices instead of relying on the arbitrary choice of a
specific index.
In the literature, there are two distinct ethical views of higher order principles of aversion
to socioeconomic health inequality, one compatible with Wagstaff (2002) and the other with
9Erreygers, Clarke and Van Ourti (2012) class of symmetric indices has been included in a new Stata
routine. See O’Donnell, O’Neill, Van Ourti and Walsh (2016).
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Erreygers, Clarke and Van Ourti (2012). In his paper, Wagstaff (2002) adopts a pro-poor
health transfer sensitivity approach where health transfers occurring in the lower part of
the distribution of socioeconomic ranks are deemed to be more desirable. Subsequently,
Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014) present the details of the ethical implication of generalized
pro-poor health transfer sensitivity principles (i.e. higher order principles). They explain
that if one adopts this ethical perspective, an increase in aversion to socioeconomic health
inequality is achieved by increasing the weight of transfers occurring at lower ranks in the
distribution of socioeconomic status.10 In the context of this paper, this means that if an
index obeys A.1 (or A.1.’) and A.2 then, it obeys the sth-order pro-poor transfer sensitivity
if (−1)iω(i)(p) ≥ 0 or (−1)i+1ν(i)(p) ≥ 0 for all i = 1 to s− 1. We define the sets of indices
obeying the principle of income-related health transfer and obeying all pro-poor transfer
sensitivity principles of order i = 3 to s as Ωspi and Λ
s
pi.
Erreygers, Clarke and Van Ourti (2012) highlight that, in the context of pro-poor trans-
fer sensitivity, the weight of a progressive health transfer decreases with socioeconomic
status regardless of its distance to the median socioeconomic rank. They introduce a sym-
metric class of indices that accounts for deviations from the median of socioeconomic rank.
However, they do not formalize the associated ethical principles. This is why we propose
formal definitions of different transfer-sensitivity principles that are compatible with the
upside-down test. Given that a class of indices that passes the upside-down test is more
sensitive to transfers occurring farther away from the median of socioeconomic statuses (i.e.,
for cases when β > 2), we label the associated ethical principles as the pro-extreme rank
transfer sensitivity principles. We also provide a formal presentation of the pro-extreme
10At this point, it is important to note that some caution has to be taken when interpreting the transfer
principles related to Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014). The interpretation of these transfer principles are specific
to their cardinalized health variables; a transfer should involve a marginal change that leads to a jump across
the threshold. This is not required in the context of this paper. An interesting transfer principle adapted to
the case of ordinal (binary) variables are bilateral transfers. These transfers involve a movement of a mass
from one outcome to another is provided by Sonne-Schmidt et al. (2016)
12
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rank transfer sensitivity principles, starting with the third order then generalizing to the
sth order.
Figure 2 illustrates two equivalent 3rd order pro-extreme rank favorable combinations of
transfers. An index obeying 3rd order pro-extreme rank transfer sensitivity reacts favorably
to a combination of progressive transfers occurring farther away from the median (p2 to p1
or p6 to p5) and a regressive one occurring closer to the median (p3 to p4). Both progressive
transfers have a similar impact on the value of ranges r(p1) = h(p6) − h(p1) − δh and
r(p2) = h(p5) − h(p2) + δh when p6 = 1 − p1 and p5 = 1 − p2. Since pro-extreme rank
principles focus on the range, r(p), there is an ethical equivalence between a transfer from
p2 to p1 and from p6 to p5. It is important to note that indices at the third order still weight
negatively the transfer from p3 to p4. However, since pro-extreme rank transfer sensitivity
imposes higher ethical weights on transfers affecting ranges in the bottom of socioeconomic
statuses, this negative transfer is more than compensated by a progressive transfer occurring
further away from the median (from p2 to p1 or equivalently, from p6 to p5). Following a
similar logic, order s pro-extreme rank transfer sensitivity principles impose an increasing
weight to transfers occurring further away from the median of socioeconomic statuses as s
increases. They are defined recursively by combining two groups of transfers of order s−1, a
favorable one occurring farther from the median and an unfavorable one occurring closer to
the median of socioeconomic statuses. Formally, if a rank-dependent socioeconomic health
inequality (health achievement) index obeys A.1’ (or A.1), A.2 and A.3 (or A.3’), then it
obeys the sth-order pro-extreme rank transfer sensitivity if (−1)i+1ν(i)(p) ≥ 0 ((−1)iω(i) ≥
0) for p ∈ [0, 0.5] and for all i = 1 to s− 1. We define the sets of all rank-dependent indices
obeying the principle of income-related health transfer and obeying all pro-extreme rank
transfer sensitivity principles of order i = 3 to s as Λsρ and Ω
s
ρ. It is important to note that
since pro-poor and pro-extreme rank principles are different, an index that belongs to Λsρ
13
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does not belong to Λspi and an index that belongs to Ω
s
ρ does not belong to Ω
s
pi.
To conclude, it is important to emphasize that the two sets of higher order ethical
principles are different, they are developed from (and presented as an extension of) the same
ethical view, the principle of income-related health transfer. This principle puts more weight
on health improvements if they happen further down in the distribution of socioeconomic
statuses. This means that a transfer of health to a person with lower income is deemed
socially improving. Both ethical views agreed on this principle. The additional ethical
constraint that Erreygers, Clarke and Van Ourti (2012) apply on socioeconomic health
inequality indices, the upside-down test, imposes a view of inequality that focuses on the
range of health levels r(p) rather than on the health levels h(p). In this context, it is natural
to interpret an increase aversion to socioeconomic health inequality as an increase in the
weight of transfers occurring farther away from the median. Since these two normative
views co-exist in the health inequality literature, the next section proposes tests that identify
robust rankings for each of these views.
5 Identifying robust orderings of health distributions
When an analyst uses indices to perform a comparison between two distributions, one
important question surfaces: is the comparison obtained valid for wide spectra of indices
obeying the same set of ethical principles? More specifically, is the comparison contingent
on the particular mathematical expression of the index? To answer this question, one needs
an approach that allows for comparisons that are robust over broad spectra of indices; this
is why a dominance approach is necessary.
In this section, we first present some dominance tests developed in Makdissi and Yazbeck
(2014). These tests are based on the standard health concentration curves (Wagstaff, Paci
and Van Doorslaer, 1991), generalized health concentration curves, s-health concentration
14
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curves and generalized s-health concentration curves. The health concentration curve may
be used to identify orderings of distributions that are robust for all rank-dependent so-
cioeconomic health inequality indices. Also, generalized health concentration curves may
be used to identify robust orderings of health achievement indices. To identify robust
orderings for subsets of socioeconomic health inequality and health achievement indices
obeying pro-poor transfer sensitivity principles, the analyst can rely on s-health concentra-
tion curves and generalized s-health concentration curves respectively. Also, in this section,
we propose new tests that identify robust orderings of distributions for indices obeying pro-
extreme rank transfer sensitivity ethical principles. In doing so, we introduce new graphical
tools: s-health range and generalized s-health range concentration curves. These curves
are akin to the s-health concentration curves and generalized s-health concentration curves
but are different as they are designed to obey the symmetry around the median principle
and pro-extreme rank ethical principles.
5.1 Socioeconomic health inequality orderings
Before providing more details about the proposed dominance tests, it is important to pro-
vide some background on health concentration curves. Wagstaff, Paci and Van Doorslaer
(1991) introduced the health concentration curve in the health economics literature. This
curve plots the cumulativ proportion of total health in the population against the cu-
mulative proportion of individuals ranked by socioeconomic status. Formally, the health
concentration curve, Ci(p), associated with f
i
Y,H , is defined on the interval [0, 1] as
Ci(p) =
1
µhi
∫ p
0
hi(u)du (5)
When this curve lies above (under) the 45◦ diagonal, health inequality is pro-poor (pro-
rich)11. An opposite conclusion may be reached if the analysis is based on an ill-health
variable.
11In this context pro-poor means that the poor have better health than the rich
15
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Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014) explain how these health concentration curves may be
used to identify robust orderings of distributions of income and health.12
Theorem 1 Let f1Y,H and f
2
Y,H represent two joint densities of income and health. I(h1) ≤
I(h2) for all I(h) ∈ Λ2 if and only if
C1(p) ≥ C2(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 1 is very powerful since it allows for the identification of orderings that are
robust for all rank-dependent relative socioeconomic health inequality indices. This ro-
bustness comes at a cost, as following such an approach produces an incomplete ordering
of socioeconomic health distributions.
When the ranking between two distributions is not robust, two paths may be followed.
First, the analyst may decide to rely on a particular index by imposing a specific parametric
form on the weight function (as seen in Section 3.3). In this case, depending on whether
the analyst’s ethical position is compatible with sensitivity to poverty or sensitivity to
extremities, the extended health concentration indices or the symmetric indices may be
used. While this solution leads to complete orderings of distributions, these orderings are
contingent on the ethical position adopted by the analyst and the specific mathematical
structure of the selected index.
An alternative solution is to increase the power of orderings by restricting the set of
admissible rank-dependent socioeconomic health inequality indices either via pro-poor or
via pro-extreme rank transfer sensitivity principles. It is important to note that these two
sets of principles are based on different ethical views regarding what constitutes an increase
in socioeconomic health inequality aversion (i.e., sensitivity to poverty and sensitivity to
extremities). As a result, choosing one path or the other leads to different subsets of indices
and may potentially lead to different orderings of distributions. In this case, the ordering
12For a complete proof see Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014).
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will not depend on a specific parametric form of the weight function, and therefore they
will be robust. However, as in any dominance tests, the orderings will still be contingent to
the ethical position taken by the analyst. In what follows, we focus on the the second path
and develop tests that will identify robust orderings for both types of higher order ethical
principles.
5.1.1 Pro-poor ethical principles
To test if orderings are robust for a subset of rank-dependent socioeconomic health in-
equality indices obeying these pro-poor ethical principles, Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014)
define higher order s-health concentration curves, Csi (p).
13 These curves are defined on the
interval [0, 1] as:
Csi (p) =
∫ p
0
Cs−1i (u)du, (6)
where C2i (p) = Ci(p). It is possible to identify robust rankings of distributions using these
higher order health concentration curves.14
Theorem 2 Let f1Y,H and f
2
Y,H represent two joint densities of income and health. I(h1) ≤
I(h2) for all I(h) ∈ Λspi if and only if
Cs1(p) ≥ Cs2(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 2 proposes a graphical test based on the non-intersection of two curves; the s-
health concentration curves associated with the two distributions. If there is an intersection
between the two curves at order s, the analyst can impose more restrictions on the subset of
rank-dependent relative socioeconomic health inequality indices by imposing the pro-poor
transfer sensitivity principle of order s+ 1.15
13This curves adapt to the health inequality context the concept of s-concentration curves proposed by
Makdissi and Mussard (2008) in the context of marginal indirect tax reforms.
14For a complete proof, please refer to Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014).
15As explained in Davidson and Duclos (2000), when s increases the relative weight assigned at the bottom
of the distributions increases and only the very bottom of the distributions determines which dominates the
other for very large s. At the limit, when s → ∞, a complete ranking is obtained. In this limit case, the
test consists of comparing only limp→0
h1(p)
µh1
and limp→0
h2(p)
µh2
.
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5.1.2 Symmetry around the median and pro-extreme rank ethical principles
As mentioned earlier, the analyst can choose to restrict the set of admissible rank-dependent
socioeconomic health inequality indices by imposing symmetry around the median and pro-
extreme rank transfer sensitivity. To test if the orderings are robust for a subset of socioeco-
nomic health inequality indices that obey these normative principles, we need to introduce
a new graphical tool, the s-health range curves, Rsi (p), associated with distribution f
i
Y,H .
These curves are defined on the interval [0, 0.5] as:
Rsi (p) =
{ 1
µhi
∫ p
0 ri(u)du if s = 2∫ p
0 R
s−1
i (u)du if s ∈ {3, 4, . . . }
(7)
The health range curve, R2(p), has as intuitive graphical interpretation that is akin to the
interpretation of the health concentration curve, C2(p). It represents the cumulative relative
health range at rank p (relative to the average health level). In this case, the horizontal axis
plays a role that is analogous to the 45-degree line for the health concentration curve. If the
health range curve, R2(p), is above this horizontal axis, it indicates that the distribution of
health (ill-health) is pro-rich (pro-poor). On the other hand, if it is below this axis, it implies
that the distribution is pro-poor (pro-rich). In addition to their intuitive interpretation, it
is possible to identify robust orderings using these curves.16
Theorem 3 Let f1Y,H and f
2
Y,H represent two joint densities of income and health. I(h1) ≤
I(h2) for all I(h) ∈ Λsρ if and only if
Rs2(p) ≥ Rs1(p) for all p ∈ [0, 0.5].
Theorem 3 provides a simple graphical test for the identification of robust orderings.
Note that since Λsρ is a subset of indices that belongs to Λ
2, the test based on R2i (p) curves
has more ordering power (is less general) than the test based on health concentration curves
in Theorem 1. This increase in ordering power is obtained by imposing the principle of
16For a complete proof, please refer to Appendix A2
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symmetry around the median on the indices. Restricting the requirement for a unanimous
ordering to a smaller set of indices eases the identification of robust orderings. If the analyst
thinks that a socioeconomic health inequality index should pass the upside-down test, then
she should use R2i (p) curves, instead of health concentration curves Ci(p). In this case,
the only cost associated with the increase in the ordering power of the test is imposing
symmetry of ν(p).17 If there is an intersection between two health range curves at order
s, the analyst can impose more restriction on the subset of rank-dependent socioeconomic
health inequality indices by imposing the pro-extreme rank transfer sensitivity principle of
order s+ 1.18
5.2 Health achievement orderings
Robust rankings of health achievement can be identified using the generalized health concen-
tration curve. At quantile p, the generalized health concentration curve gives the absolute
contribution of the p poorest individuals to average health. In other words, its value in-
dicates the average health that would be attained if total health was only the sum of the
health of these p poorest individuals. Formally, the generalized health concentration curve,
GCi(p), associated with distribution f
i
Y,H , is defined on the interval [0, 1] as
GCi(p) =
∫ p
0
hi(u)du (8)
Generalized health concentration curves may be used to identify robust orderings of joint
distributions of income and health.19
17As we will see in the empirical examples presented in the Section 7, it is clear that imposing symmetry
around the median (i.e. using range curves) allows for an increase in the power of orderings of socioeconomic
health inequality.
18At the limit, when s → ∞, a complete ranking is obtained. In this limit case, the test consists of
comparing only limp→0
r1(p)
µh1
and limp→0
r2(p)
µh2
.
19For a complete proof, please refer to Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014).
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Theorem 4 Let f1Y,H and f
2
Y,H represent two joint densities of income and health. A(h1) ≥
A(h2) for all A(h) ∈ Ω2 if and only if
GC1(p) ≥ GC2(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 4 allows for the identification of health achievement orderings that remain
valid for all rank-dependent health achievement indices. However, this robustness comes at
the cost of an incomplete order. As earlier, in case there is no dominance, two paths may
be followed: choosing a particular index or imposing higher order ethical principles. As in
the case of inequality indices, we follow the second path.
5.2.1 Pro-poor ethical principles
Let us first consider pro-poor transfer sensitivity principles. Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014)
introduce s-generalized health concentration curves, GCsi (p), for the identification of these
robust orderings. These curves are defined on the interval [0, 1] as
GCsi (p) =
∫ p
0
GCs−1i (u)du, (9)
where GC2i (p) = GCi(p). Robust rankings of distributions can be identified using these
higher order generalized health concentration curves.20
Theorem 5 Let f1Y,H and f
2
Y,H represent two joint densities of income and health. A(h1) ≥
A(h2) for all A(h) ∈ Ωspi if and only if
GCs1(p) ≥ GCs2(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 5 proposes another graphical test based on the non-intersection of two curves,
the s-generalized health concentration curves associated with the two distributions. If
there is an intersection between the two curves at order s, the analyst can impose more
20For a complete proof, please refer to Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014)
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restriction on the subset of rank-dependent achievement indices by imposing the pro-poor
transfer sensitivity principle of order s+ 1.21
5.2.2 Symmetry around the median and pro-extreme rank ethical principles
An alternative path to imposing pro-poor ethical principles consists in restricting the set
of admissible health achievement indices by imposing symmetry around the median and
pro-extreme rank ethical principles. In this case, the identification of robust orderings is
based on a new graphical tool, the s-generalized health range curves, GRsi (p), associated
with distribution f iY,H . These curves are defined on the interval [0, 0.5] as:
GRsi (p) =
{ ∫ p
0 ri(u)du if s = 2∫ p
0 GR
s−1
i (u)du if s ∈ {3, 4, . . . }
(10)
As for health range curves, GR2(p) has an appealing graphical interpretation. It represents
the cumulative absolute health range at rank p. In addition to this intuitive graphical
interpretation at order 2, these range curves can be used to obtain robust rankings of
socioeconomic health distributions.22
Theorem 6 Let f1Y,H and f
2
Y,H represent two joint densities of income and health. A(h1) ≥
A(h2) for all A(h) ∈ Ωsρ if and only if
GRs2(p) ≥ GRs1(p) for all p ∈ [0, 0.5].
and,
µh1 ≥ µh2
Theorem 6 offers another graphical test. However, the identification of robust rankings
for indices obeying the symmetry around the median and pro-extreme rank transfer princi-
ples has an additional condition on the average of health level when compared to pro-poor
transfer principles.23
21At the limit, when s → ∞, a complete ranking is obtained. In this limit case, the test consists of
comparing only limp→0 h1(p) and limp→0 h2(p).
22For a complete proof, please refer to Appendix A2.
23Since Theorem 6 states necessary and sufficient conditions, the tests on the averages and on the range
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6 Estimation and inference
In this section, we show how to estimate the curves presented in the previous section. We
then show how one can perform statistical inference and thus identify rankings that are
robust to the set of indices selected by the analyst.
6.1 Concentration and range curves estimators
Suppose we have a random sample of N individuals drawn from a joint distribution fH,Y .
We first show how to construct estimators of C and R, Cs and Rs for s > 2 and then show
how to test dominance using these curves. We start by showing that C and R can both be
written in a form that is directly amenable to non-parametric estimation. Given that C(p)
can be re-written as
C(p) =
1
µh
∫ 1
0
1(u < p)h(u)du, (11)
a simple estimator for C(p) can be written as follows:
Ĉ(p) =
1
Nh¯
N∑
i=1
hi1(yi 6 Fˆ−1Y (p)) (12)
from a sample (yi, hi) for i = 1, . . . , n. Here h¯ is the sample average and Fˆ
−1
Y is a non-
parametric estimator of the quantile function of Y based on the order statistics of (yi).
Estimators for Cs(p) can be recursively derived from that of C(p) (for details see Appendix
A3.1). The resulting estimators are as follows:
Ĉs(p) =
1
Nh¯
N∑
i=1
hi
(p− FˆY (yi))s−2
(s− 1)! 1(yi 6 Fˆ
−1
Y (p)) (13)
The generalized concentration curve can be therefore written as:
ĜC
s
(p) = h¯Ĉs(p) (14)
curves need to be verified. Although GC2i (1) =
∫ 1
0
hi(u)du = µhi, GR
2
i (0.5) =
∫ 0.5
0
ri(u)du 6= µh. This is
why testing for the first condition at order 2 over [0,0.5] does not imply that the second condition is verified.
As a result, the second condition is also necessary at the second order.
22
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In a similar fashion, we can construct an estimator for R. Let us first rewrite R(p) in
the same form as C(p):
µhR(p) =
∫ p
0
r(u)du (15)
Given that r(u) can be written as h(1 − u) − h(u) for u ∈ [0, 1], we can re-write this
relationship as follows:
µhR(p) =
∫ 1
1−p
h(u)du−
∫ p
0
h(u)du, (16)
which can be re-written as follows:
µhR(p) =
∫ 1
0
[1(u > 1− p)− 1(u < p)]h(u)du (17)
A simple estimator for R(p) can be written as follows:
R̂(p) =
1
Nh¯
{
N∑
i=1
hi[1(yi > Fˆ
−1
Y (1− p))]−
N∑
i=1
hi[1(yi 6 Fˆ−1Y (p))]
}
(18)
Similarly to Cs, it is possible to recursively compute estimators of Rs by first plugging the
estimators of R̂s−1, integrating them analytically and then by recursively computing R̂s
(see details in Appendix A3.2). The resulting estimators are as follows:
R̂
s
(p) =
1
Nh¯
N∑
i=1
hi
1
(s− 1)!p
s−2(p+ (s− 1)[FˆY (yi)− 1])[1(yi > Fˆ−1Y (1− p))]
− 1
Nh¯
N∑
i=1
hi
(p− FˆY (yi))s−2
(s− 1)! [1(yi 6 Fˆ
−1
Y (p))] (19)
The generalized range curve can be written as follows:
ĜR
s
(p) = h¯R̂s(p) (20)
6.2 Dominance tests
Let us denote by L one of the curves from the previous section (e.g., C(p)). Let L1 and L2
be two different theoretical curves corresponding to two different theoretical populations.
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Assume that we have an i.i.d. sample of size n1 from the random variable corresponding
to first theoretical curve L1 and an i.i.d. sample of size n2 from the random variable
corresponding to the second theoretical curve L2. Denote those samples by S1 and S2
respectively. As we are interested in testing the dominance between two distributions, we
define the new function L12(p) := L1(p) − L2(p) for p ∈ [0, 1]. The null and alternative
hypotheses we are interested in are:
H0 : L12(p) 6 0,∀p
H1 : L12(p) > 0 for some p
When performing inference, for each pair of distributions we will test a set of inequalities.
In this paper, we will test for H0: L12 ≤ 0 for all p and H0: L12 ≥ 0 for all p where under
the null we assume dominance. If we can reject one of the null hypotheses of dominance for
the same pair of distributions, then we have evidence against that null of the dominance
of one distribution over the other. While one may think that it is more intuitive to test
the null hypothesis of non-dominance and hence establish a case of dominance, such a test
requires a strong evidence against the null, which may be difficult to obtain over the entire
support (Davidson and Duclos, 2013).
The nonparametric estimators Lˆ1 and Lˆ2, of L1 and L2 respectively, can be constructed
from these two samples and subsequently Lˆ12(p) = Lˆ1(p)− Lˆ2(p). Let τ = supp L12(p), it is
straightforward to construct a KS type test statistic τˆ that is a non-parametric estimator
of τ as follows:
τˆ =
√
n1n2
n1 + n2
sup
p
Lˆ12(p). (21)
The asymptotic distribution of τˆ will be that of a functional of a two-dimensional Gaussian
process that is very complicated to compute. To overcome this issue, we rely on a bootstrap
procedure as in Shechtman et al. (2008). For a detailed description of the bootstrap
procedure, please refer to the Appendix A4.
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As for the indices obeying the symmetry around the median principle and pro-extreme
rank principles (i.e., theorem 6), the associated the joint test H10 and H
2
0 can be defined,
using GR12(p) = GR1(p)−GR2(p), as follows,
H10 : GR12(p) 6 0,∀p
H11 : GR12(p) > 0 for some p,
and,
H20 : µ1 ≥ µ2
H21 : µ1 < µ2,
where the nonparametric estimators ĜR1 and ĜR2 of GR1 and GR2 can respectively be
constructed from the two samples and subsequently, ĜR12(p) = ĜR1(p)− ĜR2(p).
The test statistic, τˆ , for testing H0 (H
1
0 ) takes the same form; however, the joint test
(i.e., H10 and H
2
0 ) has an additional condition on the mean that needs to be tested when
establishing the dominance results. To account for this additional condition, we adjust
the significance level of the joint test by relying on the Holm procedure as described in
the Lehmann and Romano (2005) [chapter 9 p. 348]. The purpose of the procedure is to
control for the family-wise error rate (FWER), which is the probability of one or more false
rejections not exceeding a certain level, by making sure that this error is below a certain
threshold α.
Let I ⊂ {1, 2} be the set of indices for which H i0 is true for i = 1, 2, then the objective is
to ensure the following condition: Pr
{
reject any H i0 with i ∈ I
}
6 α. Given the two tests
H10 and H
2
0 with p-values p1 and p2, the Holm procedure works as follows. First, order
the p-values pA 6 pB, where A,B ∈ {1, 2} and A 6= B, and label correspondingly HA0 and
HB0 . If pA > α2 , then we do not reject both hypotheses and stop. However, if pA <
α
2 and
pB > α, then we reject HA0 and do not reject HB0 . Otherwise, reject both hypotheses. It
25
Page 27 of 54
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
should be noted that if we reject one of the two hypotheses, then we reject dominance.
7 Empirical illustration
To provide evidence that the differences between various ethical principles adopted by the
analyst influence the type of conclusion reached, we conduct an empirical illustration of
the methods proposed using National Health Interview Survey data from years 1997 and
2014. We focus on comparisons of two ill-health variables that have been of great interest in
the health economics literature: cigarettes consumption (i.e., the number of cigarettes/day)
and overweightedness. We follow Bilger, Kruger and Finkelstein (2016) and use max[0,BMI-
25] as a measure of overweightedness. Given that the empirical application is mainly for
illustration purposes, we will refrain from drawing policy recommendation, but we will
indicate potential interesting paths.
The NHIS monitors health outcomes of Americans since 1957. It is a cross-sectional
household interview survey representative of American households and non-institutionalized
individuals. It contains data on a broad range of health topics that are collected via personal
household interviews. For comparison purposes, we focus on 1997 and 2014 public use data
and restrict our attention to the adult population. After applying all these restrictions
to the data, we end up with a sample size of 34776 for overweightedness and 35667 for
cigarette consumption in 1997 and is 35197 for overweightedness and 36363 for cigarette
consumption in 2014. We use the sample adult file to extract information on health-related
behavior and use family income adjusted for family size to infer the socioeconomic rank of
individuals.24
We first start the illustration by looking at comparisons from an inequality perspective
and then revisit these comparisons from an achievement perspective.
24We compute equivalent income by dividing family income by the square root of household size.
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7.1 Comparisons of inequalities in health-related behaviors and outcomes
In the first set of inequalities comparisons presented in Table 1 we focus on comparisons
(over time) at the national level. These comparisons are complemented by regional com-
parisons in Table 2. Cigarette consumption seems to display a higher socioeconomic health
inequality in 2014 than in 1997 (Figure 3). There is a clear dominance of the concentration
curve C22014 over C
2
1997 without any intersection on the interval [0, 1]. As is shown in Table
1, when the null hypothesis is that of the dominance of C21997 over C
2
2014 there is a very
weak evidence against the null. However, when the null hypothesis of the dominance of
C22014 over C
2
1997 is tested, there is strong evidence against the null (p-value=0.0000). As
a result, one can conclude that there is more socioeconomic health inequality in smoking
in 2014 for all indices obeying the income-related health transfer principle. While deriving
any policy conclusion is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to emphasize that
an increase in the disparities at the cigarette consumption level may be a major contributor
to the widening disparities in health outcomes.
In addition to testing dominance at the second order (i.e., C2) we provide a test for order
3 dominance, C3, and order 2 dominance for indices meeting the upside-down test criteria
(i.e., ranges curves R2). We know from our theoretical results that if dominance is obtained
at the second order for the C2, it follows that dominance will be obtained for both higher
order dominance Cs and second order range curves R2. To show the empirical validity of
these theoretical results we conduct this additional test. Test results presented in the lower
panel of Table 1 confirm what was theoretically expected; there is more socioeconomic
health inequality in smoking in 2014 than 1997. This is true for all indices obeying the
income-related health transfer principle and for the subset of these indices obeying the
pro-poor transfer sensitivity principle. Similarly, as there is more socioeconomic health
inequality in smoking in 2014 for all indices obeying the income-related health transfer
27
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principle, this result applies to the subset of these indices passing the upside-down test.
Another health variable that one may want to consider in the analysis of socioeconomic
health inequality is overweightedness (defined as max[0, BMI − 25]). Overweightedness
is defined as any positive deviation (in BMI units) from the maximal threshold of the
normal (healthy) weight category. Since deviations from below and above the healthy
weight category are deemed negative, BMI is not an ill-health ratio-scale variable. However,
Bilger, Kruger and Finkelstein’s (2016) transformation, for a given threshold, is a cardinal
variable with a well defined 0. Looking at the top left panel in Figure 4, one can notice
that the two overweightedness concentration curves (C2) intersect. There is strong evidence
against the null when dominance of C21997 over C
2
2014 and dominance of C
2
2014 over C
2
1997
are tested at the 1% level (p-values are respectively 0.0060 and 0.0000 in Table-1).25 As
a result, we cannot assess whether socioeconomic health inequality in overweightedness
has increased or decreased when we consider all indices obeying the income-related health
transfer principle. As mentioned earlier in the paper, when there is no clear dominance in
the context of concentration curves (i.e., C2), one can consider the subset of indices obeying
a higher order ethical such as the pro-poor transfer sensitivity principle (i.e. considering,
C3) so we follow this path. The results shown in the top right panel of Figure 4 allow for the
conclusion that socioeconomic health inequality in overweightedness decreases from 1997
to 2014. In other words, there is more socioeconomic health inequality in overweightedness
in 1997 for all indices obeying the income-related health transfer principle as well as the
pro-poor transfer sensitivity principle. An alternative path may be taken in the absence of
dominance at the second order if one is willing to focus on the subset of indices passing
25It is important to note that if one decreases the level to 0.5%, the dominance conclusions reached at
order 2 will not hold at third order. While this may seem in contradiction with the theory at first, it is not
the case in this application. In reality this “incoherence” between the second and third order dominance
is due to the magnitude of the distance just before p = 0.8 in the first panel of Figure 4. Given that this
distance is quite large, integrating the second order curves results apparently flipped around result at the
third order.
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the upside-down test (i.e., R2 curves). As shown in the lower panel of Figure 4, following
these paths lead to the same conclusion as the one reached when exploring higher order
dominance in the case of concentration curves. Indeed, there is more socioeconomic health
inequality in overweightedness in 1997 for all indices obeying the income-related health
transfer principle and the upside-down test and these results are supported by the associated
p-values displayed in Table 1. It is important to note that the subset of indices obeying
higher order pro-poor principles and the subset of indices that pass the upside-down test
are disjoint. So while the conclusions reached in this part of the empirical application are
the same, there is no theoretical reason for this to be always the case.
As for regional comparisons, we focus our attention on the most recent year, 2014
and compare the Northeast, the West, the Midwest and the South.26 When we focus
on cigarette consumption, we notice there are no clear patterns of dominance and thus
no complete order.27 More specifically, at 5% significance level, the West dominates the
Northeast for all indices obeying pro-poor transfer sensitivity (i.e., Λ3pi), and dominates the
South for all indices (i.e., Λ2). Also, for the subset passing the upside-down test, the West
dominates the Northeast, the Midwest at the second order (i.e., Λ2ρ). If we decrease the
significance level to 1%, then we only have one dominance result: the West dominates the
South at the second order for all indices (i.e., Λ2).
Turning our attention to regional dominance in the case of overweightedness, we notice
that the Northeast is dominated by the West, the Midwest as well as the South. While the
significance level and the order at which this dominance occur vary by region, one can safely
conclude that this dominance occurs at the 5% significance level. If we were to decrease
the significance level to 1%, then the order and subset of indices at which this dominance
occurs changes. For instance, the Northeast is dominated by the Midwest at the pro-poor
26It is important to note that we chose the most recent year to save on space.
27It is important to note that the rows have lower socioeconomic inequality than the columns.
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third order instead of the second order. Also, the Northeast is dominated by the South and
the Midwest for all subset of indices passing the upside-down test.
7.2 Comparisons of health achievements in health-related behaviors and
outcomes
In this section, we compare health achievements between 1997 and 2014. To save on space,
Table 3 will not report the p-values but rather dominance results along with the standard
notation to indicate the significance level of the dominance tests. When reading Table
3, one has to keep in mind that the columns dominate the rows; this means that when
there is dominance, the year that dominates has lower “ill health” level and hence higher
health achievement. Given that we are dealing with an “ill-health” variable it is more
sensible to talk about health failures rather than health achievements (see Makdissi, Sylla
and Yazbeck, 2013).28
Comparisons of generalized health concentration curve reveal that GC22014 dominates
GC21997 with strong evidence against the null hypothesis. This means that, as far as cigarette
consumption is concerned, there is more health failure in 1997 than in 2014 for all health
achievement(/failure) indices obeying the principle of income-related health transfer. As in
the case of inequality, we reach the same conclusion if we test for a higher order dominance
(i.e., GC3). This, once again, confirms what was theoretically expected. In other words,
since there is more health failure (when smoking is considered) in 1997 for all indices obeying
the income-related health transfer principle, it is expected this is true for the subset of these
indices that are obeying the pro-poor transfer sensitivity principle. As mentioned earlier,
the analyst may argue that the principle of pro-poor transfers sensitivity is debatable and
focus on the set of indices that pass the upside-down test. To account for this possibility,
we test for dominance using the generalized health range curves. Empirical results show
28It is important to note that the rows have lower failure than the columns in the tables which means
that the rows have a higher achievement.
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that there is more failure in smoking in 1997 for all indices obeying the income-related
health transfer principle and the upside-down test. Given that the set of indices that pass
the upside-down test are subsets of the indices belonging to Ω2, we can re-write the results
concisely by saying that there is a dominance at the second order for all rank-dependent
indices that is all indices in Ω2. As for overweightedness, we have the mirror picture of
the cigarette consumption comparison as there is more failure in 2014 than in 1997. These
second order dominance results are statistically significant at the 1% level and hold for all
rank-dependent indices (see Table 3).
Before turning to the regional comparisons, it is important to compare the results ob-
tained from the inequality analysis with the results obtained from the achievement analysis
to emphasize the policy relevance of developing and using both approaches in an inequality
analysis. While the inequality analysis revealed that there is more inequality in cigarette
consumption in 2014, the analysis on health achievement (or failure) shows that there is
a lower failure in health in 2014 than 1997. So while the inequality analysis may show
that there are concerns regarding socioeconomic inequality in smoking behavior, this same
behavior seems to be less prevalent when assessed by a measure that puts higher weight for
smoking behavior when it occurs in the lower part of the income distribution. The same
logic applies to the results obtained in overweightedness. The socioeconomic inequalities
are lower in 2014 than in 1997 but the failure is higher in 2014 than in 1997. The results
discussed in this section indicate that focusing on inequality alone provides an incomplete
picture of the situation.
As for regional comparisons for health failures, it is clear that we have more results than
in the inequality section. The first panel of Table 4 focuses on cigarette consumption in
2014 and shows that we have dominance results for all regions at the 1% level. This allows
for a complete ordering of regions in ascending inequalities as follows West, Northeast,
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South and Midwest. The second panel in Table 4 shows second order dominance results for
overweightedness at mixed significance levels (i.e., some are at the 5% level and others are at
the 1% level). Unlike the case of cigarette consumption, we do not have a complete ordering
of regions for overweightedness. All we can say is that the West dominates the Northeast,
the Midwest and the South and that the Northeast dominates the Midwest and South. To
assess whether we can have a dominance result at a higher significance level (i.e., 1% level
instead of 5% level) for the Northeast and West, we focus on indices that pass the upside-
down text. In doing so, one needs to remember that testing for achievement (/failure) for
these subsets of indices requires a joint test on the range curves and the average value of
the health variable. Figure 6 displays GR2 curves for the two regions where GR2W seem
to be everywhere above (or equal) to GR2NE . The results of the associated statistical tests
displayed in Table 5 suggest that we cannot reject dominance and that the West has less
failure in overweightedness than the Northeast if we focus our attention on indices that
pass the upside-down test and obey the principle of income-related health transfer.29
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we adopt a unified approach to indices that obey pro-poor ethical principles as
well as the symmetry around the median ethical principle and pro-extreme rank principles.
To do so, we first fill the gap in the literature by formalizing the ethical principles associated
with the symmetric indices (i.e., the set of indices that pass the upside-down test). We coin
these ethical principles as the symmetry around the median ethical principle and pro-extreme
rank ethical principles. We then develop the curves associated with these principles, the
health range curve and the s-health range curves, and derive the dominance conditions that
allow us to identify robust orderings of joint distributions of income and health. Having
filled the gap in the inequality measurement literature, we proceed to the literature on
29Note that, if we consider the p-values in Table 5, we cannot reject equality between µNE and µW .
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the statistical inference and provide the natural estimators for the indices obeying both
pro-poor and pro-extreme rank ethical principles. Based on these estimators and on the
work of Schechtman et al. (2008) we develop KS-type statistical tests associated with
the dominance tests for indices obeying both ethical principles. Finally, to illustrate the
applicability of the methods proposed we provide an empirical illustration using information
on overweightedness and cigarette consumption from the NHIS 1997 and 2014.
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the information on the level of health
(ill-health) takes the form of a ratio-scale cardinal variable. This means that we allow
the social weight functions to take different mathematical forms assuming that we know
the value of the level of health. This last assumption does not hold for categorical health
variables such as self-reported health statuses as any increasing cardinal scale is a valid
representation of a categorical variable. To address this issue, one may cardinalize the
categorical health measure (Makdissi and Yazbeck, 2014) or use a dominance approach
that is invariant to the numerical scale (Allison and Foster, 2004; Sonne-Schmidt, Tarp and
Østerdal, 2016; and Makdissi and Yazbeck, 2017). Since many of health variables available
in surveys are categorical, future research is needed to allow the researcher to use cardinal
variables while dealing simultaneously with the multiplicity of social weight functions and
of cardinal scales.
In addition, it may be argued that the normative views presented in this paper (rank-
dependent views) are debatable. One could extend this paper to account for this possibility
by following Karsu (2016) and Karsu, Morton and Argyris (2012) and imposing other nor-
mative restrictions on the decision maker’s preferences. This can be achieved by proposing
a class of indices displaying aversion to pure health inequality (by transforming the health
level using an s-concave function) in addition to aversion to socioeconomic health inequality
as in Makdissi and Yazbeck (2016).
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Table 1: Dominance tests for Cs and Rs comparisons for cigarette consumption and over-
weightedness
p-value
cigarette cons. overweightedness
s=2 s=3 s=2 s=3
H0 : C
s
1997(p) 6 Cs2014(p),∀p
H1 : C
s
1997(p) > C
s
2014(p) for some p 0.9970 0.8248 0.0060 0.0010
H0 : C
s
2014(p) 6 Cs1997(p),∀p
H1 : C
s
2014(p) > C
s
1997(p) for some p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8658
H0 : R
s
1997(p) 6 Rs2014(p),∀p
H1 : R
s
1997(p) > R
s
2014(p) for some p 0.0000 0.5305
H0 : R
s
2014(p) 6 Rs1997(p),∀p
H1 : R
s
2014(p) > R
s
1997(p) for some p 0.9670 0.0020
Table 2: Regional dominance tests: cigarette consumption and overweightedness
Cigarette consumption
Northeast West Midwest South
Northeast - ND ND
West Λ3pi
∗∗ and Λ2ρ ∗∗ - Λ2ρ ∗∗ Λ2 ∗∗∗
Midwest ND - ND
South ND ND -
overweightedness
Northeast West Midwest South
Northeast -
West Λ2 ∗∗∗ - ND ND
Midwest Λ2 ∗∗ and Λ3pi ∗∗∗ and Λ2ρ ∗∗∗ ND - ND
South Λ2 ∗∗ and Λ2ρ ∗∗∗ ND ND -
Significance levels ∗∗ 5%; ∗∗∗ 1%
Table 3: Evolution of health failures: 1997-2014
1997 2014
1997 - overweightedness: Ω2 ∗∗∗
2014 Cigarette: Ω2 ∗∗∗ -
Significance levels: ∗∗ 5%; ∗∗∗ 1%.
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Table 4: Regional dominance tests: cigarette consumption and overweightedness
Cigarette consumption
Northeast West Midwest South
Northeast - Ω2 ∗∗∗ Ω2 ∗∗∗
West Ω2 ∗∗∗ - Ω2 ∗∗∗ Ω2 ∗∗∗
Midwest -
South Ω2 ∗∗∗ -
overweightedness
Northeast West Midwest South
Northeast - Ω2 ∗∗∗ Ω2 ∗∗∗
West Ω2 ∗∗ and Ω2ρ ∗∗∗ - Ω2 ∗∗∗ Ω2 ∗∗∗
Midwest - ND
South ND -
Significance levels ∗∗ 5%; ∗∗∗ 1%
Table 5: Dominance tests for failure in overweightedness between the Northeast and the
West for indices belonging to Ω2ρ
p-value
H0 : GR
2
W (p) 6 GR2NE(p),∀p
H1 : GR
2
W (p) > GR
2
NE(p) for some p 0.0040
H0 : GR
2
NE(p) 6 GR2W (p),∀p
H1 : GR
2
NE(p) > GR
2
W (p) for some p 0.9219
H0 : µW > µNE
H1 : µW < µNE 0.2843
H0 : µNE > µW
H1 : µNE < µW 0.7157
H0 : µW = µNE
H1 : µW 6= µNE 0.5876
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Figure 1: Second order ethical principle
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Figure 2: Third order pro-extreme rank transfer sensitivity
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Figure 3: C2 comparison: cigarette consumption
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Figure 4: Socioeconomic inequality in Obesity/Overweight
C2(p) C3(p)
R2(p)
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Figure 5: Second order health failures comparisons
Cigarette
overweightedness
Figure 6: GR2 comparison: overweightedness
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Appendix
A1 Set of indices
The proofs are based on the following mathematical definition of the set of indices.
Ω2 :=
A(h)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω(p) is continuous and differentiable almost
everywhere over [0, 1] ,
∫ 1
0 ω(p)dp = 1,
ω(1) = 0, ω(1) (p) ≤ 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1]
 .
Λ2 :=
I(h)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν(p) is continuous and differentiable almost
everywhere over [0, 1] ,
∫ 1
0 ν(p)dp = 0,
ν(1) = 1, ν(1) (p) > 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1]
 .
Λ2ρ :=
{
I(h) ∈ Λ2 | ν(1− p) = −ν(p) ∀p ∈ [0, 1]} .
Ω2ρ :=
{
AA(h) ∈ Ω2 | ω(1− p) = 2− ω(p) ∀p ∈ [0, 1]
}
.
Ωspi :=
A(h) ∈ Ω2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω(p) is continuous and (s− 1)-time differentiable almost
everywhere over [0, 1] , ω(i)(1) = 0, (−1)i ω(i) (p) ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1],
∀i = 1, 2, . . . , s− 1
 .
Λspi :=
I(h) ∈ Λ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν(p) is continuous and (s− 1)-time differentiable almost
everywhere over [0, 1] , ν(i)(1) = 0, (−1)i+1 ν(i) (p) ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1],
∀i = 1, 2, . . . , s− 1
 .
Λsρ :=
I(h) ∈ Λ2ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν(p)is continuous and (s− 1)-time differentiable almost
everywhere over [0, 1] , ν(i)(0.5) = 0, (−1)i+1 ν(i) (p) ≥ 0,
∀p ∈ [0, 0.5], ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , s− 1
 .
Ωsρ :=
A(h) ∈ Ω2ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω(p)is continuous and (s− 1)-time differentiable almost
everywhere over [0, 1] , ω(i)(0.5) = 0, (−1)i ω(i) (p) ≥ 0,
∀p ∈ [0, 0.5], ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , s− 1
 .
Note that increasing s means imposing more ethical structure on indices. This in turns
implies that Ωspi ⊂ Ωs−1pi ⊂ · · · ⊂ Ω3pi ⊂ Ω2, Λspi ⊂ Λs−1pi ⊂ · · · ⊂ Λ3pi ⊂ Λ2, Λsρ ⊂ Λs−1ρ ⊂ · · · ⊂
Λ3ρ ⊂ Λ2ρ ⊂ Λ2 and Ωsρ ⊂ Ωs−1ρ ⊂ · · · ⊂ Ω3ρ ⊂ Ω2ρ ⊂ Ω2.
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A2 Proofs for section 4
Proofs of Theorems 1, 2, 4, 5 are provided by Makdissi and Yazbeck (2014).
Proof of Theorem 3. First note that for I(h) ∈ Λsρ, equation (1) can be rewritten as
I(h) = − 1
µh
∫ 0.5
0
ν(p)r(p)dp (A1)
Integrating by parts equation (A1), we get
I(h) = −ν(p)R2(p)∣∣0.5
0
+
∫ 0.5
0
ν(1)(p)R2(p)dp. (A2)
Since by definition R2(0) = 0 and ν(0.5) = 0 for all indices I(h) ∈ Λsρ, the first term on the
right hand side of the equation is nil. This yields to
I(h) =
∫ 0.5
0
ν(1)(p)R2(p)dp. (A3)
Now assume that for s− 1, we have
I(h) = (−1)s−1
∫ 0.5
0
ν(s−2)(p)Rs−1(p)dp. (A4)
Integrating by parts equation (A4) yields
I(h) = (−1)s−1
{
ν(s−2)(p)Rs(p)
∣∣∣0.5
0
−
∫ 0.5
0
ν(s−1)Rs(p)dp
}
. (A5)
Since by definition Rs(0) = 0 and ν(s−2)(0.5) = 0 for all indices I(h) ∈ Λsρ, the first term
in the braces on the right hand side of the equation is nil. This yield
I(h) = (−1)s
∫ 0.5
0
ν(s−1)(p)Rs(p)dp. (A6)
Given that equations (A3) and (A6) both conform to the relation depicted in equation
(A4), it follows that equation (A6) holds for all s ∈ {2, 3, . . . }. Let ∆I12 = I(h2) − I(h1).
From equation (A6), we get
∆I12 = (−1)s
∫ 0.5
0
ν(s−1)(p) [Rs2(p)−Rs1(p)] dp. (A7)
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Note that (−1)sν(s−1)(p) is non negative. This implies that if Rs2(p) ≥ Rs1(p) for all p ∈
[0, 0.5], then ∆I12 ≥ 0. This proves for sufficiency of the condition.
Having provided a sufficiency condition let us now prove for the necessity of the con-
dition. Consider now the set of indices I(h) ∈ Λsρ for which ν(s−2)(p) takes the following
form:
ν(s−2)(p) =

(−1)s−1ε 0 ≤ pc
(−1)s−1 [pc + ε− p] pc ≤ p ≤ pc + ε
0 p ≥ pc + ε
(A8)
where pc ∈ [0, 0.5]. Since ν(p) is differentiable almost everywhere, it satisfies the conditions
in the definition of Λsρ. Differentiating equation (A8) yields
ν(s−1)(p) =

0 0 ≤ pc
(−1)s pc ≤ p ≤ pc + ε
0 p ≥ pc + ε
(A9)
Imagine now that Rs2(p) < R
s
1(p) on an interval [pc, pc + ε] for ε that can be arbitrarily
close to 0. For any ν(p) obeying the relation in equation (A8), the expression in equation
(A7) is negative. Hence it cannot be that Rs2(p) < R
s
1(p) for p ∈ [pc, pc + ε]. This proves
the necessity of the condition.
Proof of Theorem 6. First note that for A(h) ∈ Ωsρ, equation (4) can be rewritten as
A(h) =
∫ 1
0
(1− ν(p))h(p)dp (A10)
A(h) = µh −
∫ 1
0
ν(p)h(p)dp (A11)
A(h) = µh −
∫ 0.5
0
ν(p)h(p)dp−
∫ 1
0.5
ν(p)h(p)dp (A12)
Since r(p) = h(1− p)− h(p) and ν(p) = −ν(1− p), we can rewrite equation (A12) as
A(h) = µh +
∫ 0.5
0
ν(p)r(p)dp (A13)
Integrating by parts equation (A13), we get
A(h) = µh + ν(p)GR
2(p)
∣∣0.5
0
−
∫ 0.5
0
ν(1)(p)GR2(p)dp. (A14)
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Since by definition GR2(0) = 0 and ν(0.5) = 0 for all indices A(h) ∈ Ωsρ, the second term
on the right hand side of the equation is nil. This yields to
A(h) = µh −
∫ 0.5
0
ν(1)(p)GR2(p)dp. (A15)
Now assume that for s− 1, we have
A(h) = µh + (−1)s−2
∫ 0.5
0
ν(s−2)(p)GRs−1(p)dp. (A16)
Integrating by parts the second term of the r.h.s. of equation (A16) yields
A(h) = µh + (−1)s−2
{
ν(s−2)(p)GRs(p)
∣∣∣0.5
0
−
∫ 0.5
0
ν(s−1)GRs(p)dp
}
. (A17)
Since by definition GRs(0) = 0 and ν(s−2)(0.5) = 0 for all indices A(h) ∈ Ωρ, the first term
in the braces on the right hand side of the equation is nil. This yield
A(h) = µh + (−1)s−1
∫ 0.5
0
ν(s− 1)(p)GRs(p)dp. (A18)
Given that equations (A15) and (A18) both conform to the relation depicted in equation
(A16), it follows that equation (A18) holds for all s ∈ {2, 3, . . . }. Let ∆A12 = A(h2)−A(h1).
From equation (A18), we get
∆A12 = µh2 = µh1 + (−1)s−1
∫ 0.5
0
ν(s−1)(p) [GRs2(p)−GRs1(p)] dp. (A19)
Note that (−1)s−1ν(s−1)(p) is non positive. This implies that if GRs2(p) ≥ GRs1(p) for all
p ∈ [0, 0.5], then (−1)s−1 ∫ 0.50 ν(s−1)(p) [GRs2(p)−GRs1(p)] dp ≥ 0. If in addition, µh2 ≤ µh1,
then ∆A12 ≤ 0. This proves for sufficiency of the condition.
Having provided a sufficiency condition let us now prove for the necessity of the condi-
tion. In order to prove necessity, we need to consider three cases:
1. µh1 < µh2 together with GR
s
2(p) ≥ GRs1(p) for all p ∈ [0, 0.5]
2. GRs2(p) < GR
s
1(p) on some arbitrary small interval [pc, pc+ε] together with µh1 = µh2
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3. GRs2(p) < GR
s
1(p) on some arbitrary small interval [pc, pc+ε] together with µh1 > µh2
Case 1: Consider the set of indices A(h) ∈ Ωsρ for which ν(s−2)(p) is constant for all
p ∈ [0, 0.5]. This weight function ν(p) satisfies the conditions in the definition of Ωsρ. Since
ν(s−1)(p) = 0 for all p ∈ [0, 0.5], (−1)s−1 ∫ 0.50 ν(s−1)(p) [GRs2(p)−GRs1(p)] dp = 0. From
equation (A19) this implies that ∆A12 > 0. Hence it cannot be that µh1 < µh2.
Case 2: Consider the set of indices A(h) ∈ Ωsρ for which ν(s−2)(p) takes the following form:
ν(s−2)(p) =

(−1)s−1ε 0 ≤ pc
(−1)s−1 [pc + ε− p] pc ≤ p ≤ pc + ε
0 p ≥ pc + ε
(A20)
where pc ∈ [0, 0.5]. Since ν(p) is differentiable almost everywhere, it satisfies the conditions
in the definition of Ωsρ. Differentiating equation (A20) yields
ν(s−1)(p) =

0 0 ≤ pc
(−1)s pc ≤ p ≤ pc + ε
0 p ≥ pc + ε
(A21)
Imagine now that GRs2(p) < GR
s
1(p) on an interval [pc, pc + ε] for ε that can be arbitrarily
close to 0. For any ν(p) obeying the relation in equation (A20), the expression in equation
(A19) is negative. Hence it cannot be that GRs2(p) < GR
s
1(p) for p ∈ [pc, pc+ε] if µh1 = µh2.
Case 3: Consider the set of indices A(h) ∈ Ωsρ for which ν(s−2)(p) takes the following form:
ν(s−2)(p) =

(−1)s−1κ 0 ≤ pc
(−1)s−1κ [pc + ε− p] pc ≤ p ≤ pc + ε
0 p ≥ pc + ε
(A22)
where κ >
(µh1−µh2
ε
)
and pc ∈ [0, 0.5]. Since ν(p) is differentiable almost everywhere, it
satisfies the conditions in the definition of Ωsρ. Differentiating equation (A22) yields
ν(s−1)(p) =

0 0 ≤ pc
(−1)sκ pc ≤ p ≤ pc + ε
0 p ≥ pc + ε
(A23)
Imagine now that GRs2(p) < GR
s
1(p) on an interval [pc, pc + ε] for ε that can be arbitrarily
close to 0. For any ν(p) obeying the relation in equation (A22), the expression in equation
(A20) is negative. Hence it cannot be that GRs2(p) < GR
s
1(p) for p ∈ [pc, pc+ε] if µh1 > µh2.
Cases 1 to 3 prove the necessity of the condition.
47
Page 49 of 54
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
A3 Construction of Cs(p) and Rs(p) estimators
A3.1 Estimator for Cs(p)
As seen earlier, the health concentration curve C(p) is defined as follows
C(p) =
1
µh
∫ p
0
h(u)du. (A24)
It can be re-written as
C(p) =
1
µh
∫ 1
0
1(u < p)h(u)du. (A25)
Apply the transformation y = F−1Y (u) (with jacobian term fY (y))
C(p) =
1
µh
∫ ∞
0
1(y < F−1Y (p))h(FY (y))fY (y)dy (A26)
Let fH|Y be the conditional density of H on Y insert the following definition of the condi-
tional expectation
E[H|Y = y] =
∫ ∞
0
hfH|Y (h|y)dh (A27)
in equation A26 and using the definition for the joint density fH,Y = fH|Y fY , we get
C(p) =
1
µh
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
h1(y < F−1Y (p))fH,Y (h, y)dhdy, (A28)
which gives the simple estimator for C(p) from a sample (yi, hi) for i = 1, . . . , n:
Cˆ(p) =
1
Nh¯
N∑
i=1
hi1(yi 6 Fˆ−1Y (p)). (A29)
Here h¯ is the sample average and Fˆ−1Y is a non-parametric estimator of the quantile function
of Y based on the order statistics of (yi).
Estimators for Cs(p) could be recursively derived from that of C(p) (derivation of this result
is in section A3.3).
Cˆs(p) =
1
Nh¯
N∑
i=1
hi
(p− FˆY (yi))s−2
(s− 1)! 1(yi 6 Fˆ
−1
Y (p)) (A30)
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A3.2 Estimator for Rs(p)
In a similar fashion we can construct an estimator for R. Let us first rewrite R(p) in the
same form as C(p):
µhR(p) =
∫ p
0
r(u)du (A31)
Given that Define r(u) can be written as h(1− u)− h(u) for u ∈ [0, 1], we can re-write this
relationship as follows:
µhR(p) =
∫ 1
1−p
h(u)du−
∫ p
0
h(u)du, (A32)
which can be re-written as follows:
µhR(p) =
∫ 1
0
[1(u > 1− p)− 1(u < p)]h(u)du (A33)
If ones defines a new variable t = 1− u, then u = φ(t) = 1− t. In this framework,∫ p
0
h(1− u)du =
∫ 1−p
1
h (1− φ(t))φ′(t)dt (A34)
=
∫ 1−p
1
h (t) (−1)dt (A35)
=
∫ 1
1−p
h(t)dt (A36)
The above sequence you have written should be
µhR(p) =
∫ p
0
r(u)du (A37)
=
∫ p
0
h(1− u)du−
∫ p
0
h(u)du (A38)
= −
∫ 1−p
1
h(u)du−
∫ p
0
h(u)du (A39)
=
∫ 1
1−p
h(u)du−
∫ p
0
h(u)du (A40)
Furthermore, we could deduce that
µhR(p) =
∫ 1
0
[1(u > 1− p)− 1(u < p)]h(u)du (A41)
49
Page 51 of 54
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
This expression, upon applying a transformation y = F−1Y (u), expanding the formula for h,
yields
R(p)× µh =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
h[1(y > F−1Y (1− p))]fH,Y (h, y)dhdy (A42)
−
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
h[1(y < F−1Y (p))]fH,Y (h, y)dhdy (A43)
which yields the estimator of R(p)
Rˆ(p) =
1
Nh¯
{
N∑
i=1
hi[1(yi > Fˆ
−1
Y (1− p))]−
N∑
i=1
hi[1(yi 6 Fˆ−1Y (p))]
}
(A44)
As for Cs, it is possible to recursively compute estimators of Rs by first plugging the
estimators of Rˆ and then by recursively computing (derivation of this result is in section
A3.3)
Rˆs(p) =
∫ p
0
Rˆs−1(u)du, (A45)
and
R̂
s
(p) =
1
Nh¯
N∑
i=1
hi
1
(s− 1)!p
s−2(p+ (s− 1)[FˆY (yi)− 1])[1(yi > Fˆ−1Y (1− p))]
− 1
Nh¯
N∑
i=1
hi
(p− FˆY (yi))s−2
(s− 1)! [1(yi 6 Fˆ
−1
Y (p))] (A46)
are the resulting estimators.
A3.3 Computation of integrals containing indicator variables involving inverse
of FˆY
Even though FˆY is a step function, the following standard result holds: yi 6 Fˆ−1Y (p) if
and only if FˆY (yi) 6 p. In what follows, We will check the formula for the estimator by
induction.
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First set I1(p) =
∫ p
0 1(yi 6 Fˆ
−1
Y (u))du and compute∫ p
0
1(yi 6 Fˆ−1Y (u))du =
∫ p
0
1(FˆY (yi) 6 u)du (A47)
= (p− FˆY (yi))1(FˆY (yi) 6 p). (A48)
Then recursively compute
Ik(p) =
∫ p
0
Ik−1(u)du (A49)
=
∫ p
0
(u− FˆY (yi))k−1
k!
1(FˆY (yi) 6 u)du (A50)
=
(p− FˆY (yi))k
(k + 1)!
1(FˆY (yi) 6 p). (A51)
By making the change of variable s = k + 2, the result follows.
In order to compute integrals containing indicator variables involving the (quantile)
inverse of FˆY , it is important to make a previous argument more explicit. In fact because
FˆY is non-decreasing {yi : FˆY (yi) > p} is unbounded from above and because FˆY is right-
continuous, {yi : FˆY (yi) > p} is closed to the left, thus it is closed at its infimum. However,
by the definition of the quantile function,
Fˆ−1Y (p) = infyi
{yi : FˆY (p) > p}, (A52)
we get the set equality
{yi : FˆY (yi) > p} = [Fˆ−1Y (p),∞) (A53)
This set inequality shows that Fˆ−1Y (p) 6 yi if and only if p 6 FˆY (yi). Taking complements
of the set equality in [0,∞) yields the equality
{yi : FˆY (yi) < p} = [0, Fˆ−1Y (p))], (A54)
which implies yi < Fˆ
−1
Y (p) if and only if FˆY (yi) < p.This allows us to compute the following
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integral, ∫ p
0
1(yi > Fˆ
−1
Y (1− u))du =
∫ p
0
1(FˆY (yi) > (1− u))du (A55)
=
∫ 1
1−p
1(FˆY (yi) > u)du (A56)
= 1(FˆY (yi) > (1− p))(FˆY (yi)− 1 + p). (A57)
From equation (A57), it is clear that integrating recursively, we should obtain at step k an
integrand of the form
1
k!
pk−1(p+ k[FˆY (yi)− 1])1(FˆY (yi) > (1− p)), (A58)
resulting at step k + 1 in an integrand of the form
1
(k + 1)!
pk(p+ (k + 1)[FˆY (yi)− 1])1(FˆY (yi) > (1− p)). (A59)
We could verify that by induction. Since we checked for k = 1, what remains to do is to
check for an arbitrary k and see if we get the correct form for k + 1.
Set J1(p) = 1(yi > Fˆ
−1
Y (1− u))du and recursively compute
Jk(p) =
∫ p
0
Jk−1(u)du (A60)
=
∫ p
0
1(FˆY (yi) > (1− u)) 1
k!
uk−1(u+ k[FˆY (yi)− 1])du (A61)
= 1(FˆY (yi) > (1− p)) 1
k!
∫ p
0
uk−1(u+ k[FˆY (yi)− 1])du (A62)
= 1(FˆY (yi) > (1− p)) 1
k!
[
pk+1
k + 1
+
pk
k
k[FˆY (yi)− 1]
]
(A63)
= 1(FˆY (yi) > (1− p)) p
k
(k + 1)!
[p+ (k + 1)[FˆY (yi)− 1]] (A64)
By making the change of variable s = k + 2, the result follows.
A4 Bootstrap procedure
As suggest by Linton et al. (2005) and Shechtman et al. (2008), we used a recentered
bootstrap procedure. The bootstrap algorithm for B repetitions is constructed as follows:
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1. Repeat for b = 1, . . . , B
• Draw a sample of size n1 from S1. Compute the nonparametric estimator Lˆ1b.
• Draw a sample of size n2 from S2. Compute the nonparametric estimator Lˆ2b.
• Compute Lˆ12b(p) = Lˆ1b(p)− Lˆ2b(p).
• Compute τˆb = supp
√
n1n2
n1+n2
[Lˆ12b(p)− Lˆ12(p)].
2. Using the sample τˆ1, . . . , τˆB, compute the bootstrap p-value
1
B
B∑
b=1
1(τˆb > τˆ).
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